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Abstract Cyber-physical systems (CPS), such as automotive systems, are
starting to include sophisticated machine learning (ML) components. Their
correctness, therefore, depends on properties of the inner ML modules. While
learning algorithms aim to generalize from examples, they are only as good
as the examples provided, and recent efforts have shown that they can pro-
duce inconsistent output under small adversarial perturbations. This raises
the question: can the output from learning components lead to a failure of
the entire CPS? In this work, we address this question by formulating it as
a problem of falsifying signal temporal logic specifications for CPS with ML
components. We propose a compositional falsification framework where a tem-
poral logic falsifier and a machine learning analyzer cooperate with the aim of
finding falsifying executions of the considered model. The efficacy of the pro-
posed technique is shown on an automatic emergency braking system model
with a perception component based on deep neural networks.
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1 Introduction
Over the last decade, machine learning (ML) algorithms have achieved impres-
sive results providing solutions to practical large-scale problems (see, e.g., [4,
26,20,17]). Not surprisingly, ML is being used in cyber-physical systems (CPS)
— systems that are integrations of computation with physical processes. For
example, semi-autonomous vehicles employ Adaptive Cruise Controllers (ACC)
or Lane Keeping Assist Systems (LKAS) that rely heavily on image classifiers
providing input to the software controlling electric and mechanical subsystems
(see, e.g., [5]). The safety-critical nature of such systems involving ML raises
the need for formal methods [35]. In particular, how do we systematically find
bugs in such systems?
We formulate this question as the falsification problem for CPS models with
ML components (CPSML): given a formal specification ϕ (say in a formalism
such as signal temporal logic [23]) and a CPSML model M , find an input for
which M does not satisfy ϕ. A falsifying input generates a counterexample
trace that reveals a bug. To solve this problem, multiple challenges must be
tackled. First, the input space to be searched can be intractable. For instance,
a simple model of a semi-autonomous car already involves several control sig-
nals (e.g., the angle of the acceleration pedal, steering angle) and other rich
sensor input (e.g., images captured by a camera, LiDAR, RADAR). Second,
the formal verification of ML components is a difficult, and somewhat ill-posed
problem due to the complexity of the underlying ML algorithms, large feature
spaces, and the lack of consensus on a formal definition of correctness of an
ML component. The last point is an especially tricky challenge for ML-based
perception; see [35,34] for a longer discussion on specification of ML compo-
nents. Third, CPSML are often designed using languages such as C, C++,
or Simulink for which clear semantics are not given, and involve third-party
components that are opaque or poorly-specified. This obstructs the develop-
ment of formal methods for the analysis of CPSML models and may force one
to treat them as gray-boxes or black-boxes. Hence, we need a technique to
systematically analyze ML components within the context of a CPS that can
handle all three of these challenges.
In this paper, we propose a new framework for the falsification of CPSML
addressing the issues described above. Our technique is compositional (mod-
ular) in that it divides the search space for falsification into that of the ML
component and of the remainder of the system, while establishing a connection
between the two. The obtained projected search spaces are respectively ana-
lyzed by a temporal logic falsifier (“CPS Analyzer”) and a machine learning
analyzer (“ML analyzer”) that cooperate to search for a behavior of the closed-
loop system that violates the property ϕ. This cooperation mainly comprises
a sequence of input space projections, passing information about interesting
regions in the input space of the full CPSML model to identify a sub-space of
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Fig. 1: Automatic Emergency Braking System (AEBS) in closed loop. A ma-
chine learning based image classifier is used to perceive objects in the ego
vehicle’s frame of view.
the input space of the ML component. The resulting projected input space of
the ML component is typically smaller than the full input space. Moreover,
misclassifications in this space can be mapped back to smaller subsets of the
CPSML input space in which counterexamples are easier to find. Importantly,
our approach can handle any machine learning technique, including the meth-
ods based on deep neural networks [17] that have proved effective in many
recent applications. The proposed ML Analyzer is a tool that analyzes the
input space for the ML classifier and determines a region of the input space
that could be relevant for the full cyber-physical system’s correctness. More
concretely, the analyzer identifies sets of misclassifying features, i.e., inputs
that “fool” the ML algorithm. The analysis is performed by considering sub-
sets of parameterized features spaces that are used to approximate the ML
components by simpler functions. The information gathered by the temporal
logic falsifier and the ML analyzer together reduce the search space, providing
an efficient approach to falsification for CPSML models.
Example 1 As an illustrative example, let us consider a simple model of an Au-
tomatic Emergency Braking System (AEBS), that attempts to detect objects
in front of a vehicle and actuate the brakes when needed to avert a collision.
Figure 1 shows the AEBS as a system composed of a controller (automatic
braking), a plant (vehicle sub-system under control, including transmission),
and an advanced sensor (camera along with an obstacle detector based on
deep learning). The AEBS, when combined with the vehicle’s environment,
forms a closed loop control system. The controller regulates the acceleration
and braking of the plant using the velocity of the subject (ego) vehicle and the
distance between it and an obstacle. The sensor used to detect the obstacle in-
cludes a camera along with an image classifier based on deep neural networks.
In general, this sensor can provide noisy measurements due to incorrect image
classifications which in turn can affect the correctness of the overall system.
Suppose we want to verify whether the distance between the subject vehicle
and a preceding obstacle is always larger than 5 meters. Such a verification
requires the exploration of a very large input space comprising the control
inputs (e.g., acceleration and braking pedal angles) and the ML component’s
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feature space (e.g., all the possible pictures observable by the camera). The
latter space is particularly large — for example, note that the feature space
of RGB images of dimension 1000 × 600px (for an image classifier) contains
2561000×600×3 elements.
At first, the input space of the model described in Example 1 appears in-
tractably large. However, the twin notions of abstraction and compositionality,
central to much of the advances in formal verification, can help address this
challenge. As mentioned earlier, we decompose the overall CPSML model in-
put space into two parts: (i) the input space of the ML component, and (ii)
the input space for the rest of the system – i.e., the CPSML model with an
abstraction of the ML component. A CPS Analyzer operates on the latter
“pure CPS” input space, while an ML Analyzer handles the former. The two
analyzers communicate information as follows:
1. The CPS Analyzer initially performs conservative analyses assuming ab-
stractions of the ML component. In particular, consider two extreme ab-
stractions — a “perfect ML classifier” (i.e., all feature vectors are correctly
classified), and a “completely-wrong ML classifier” (all feature vectors are
misclassified). Abstraction permits the CPS Analyzer to operate on a lower-
dimensional input space (the “pure CPS” one) and identify a region in this
space that may be affected by the malfunctioning of some ML modules –
a so-called “region of interest” or “region of uncertainty.” This region is
communicated to the ML Analyzer.
2. The ML Analyzer projects the region of uncertainty (ROU) onto its input
space, and performs a detailed analysis of that input sub-space. Since this
detailed analysis uses only the ML classifier (not the full CPSML model),
it is a more tractable problem. In this paper, we present a novel sampling-
based approach to explore the input sub-space for the ML component. We
can also leverage other advances in analysis of machine learning systems
operating on rich sensor inputs and for applications such as autonomous
driving (see the related work section that follows).
3. When the ML Analyzer finds interesting test cases (e.g., those that trigger
misclassifications of inputs whose labels are easily inferred), it communi-
cates that information back to the CPS Analyzer, which checks whether
the ML misclassification can lead to a system-level safety violation (e.g., a
collision). If yes, we have found a system-level counterexample. If not, the
ROU is updated and the revised ROU passed back to the ML Analyzer.
The communication between the CPS Analyzer and ML Analyzer continues
until either we find a system-level counterexample, or we run out of resources.
For the class of CPSML models we consider, including those with highly non-
linear dynamics and even black-box components, one cannot expect to prove
system correctness. We focus on specifications in Signal Temporal Logic (STL),
and for this reason use a temporal logic falsifier, Breach [8], as our CPS Ana-
lyzer; however, other specification formalisms and tools may also be used and
our framework is largely agnostic to these choices. Even though temporal logic
falsification is a mature technology with initial industrial adoption (e.g., [44]),
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several technical challenges remain. First, we need to construct the validity
domain of an STL specification — the input sub-space where the property
is satisfied — for a CPSML model with abstracted (correct/incorrect) ML
components, and identify the region of uncertainty (ROU). Second, we need a
method to relate the ROU to the feature space of the ML modules. Third, we
need to systematically analyze the feature space of the ML component with
the goal of finding feature vectors leading to misclassifications. We describe in
detail in Sections 3 and 4 how we tackle these challenges.
In summary, the main contributions of this paper are:
• A compositional framework for the falsification of temporal logic properties
of arbitrary CPSML models that works for any kind of machine learning
classifier. To our knowledge, we present the first approach to falsifying tem-
poral logic properties of closed-loop CPS with ML components, including
deep neural networks.
• The first approach for formal analysis of systems that use ML for perception.
In particular, we show how to use a novel combination of abstraction and
compositional reasoning to scale falsification to the higher-dimensional input
spaces occurring for ML-based perception. Our compositional framework
is the first modular approach to verification of CPSML, and the first to
systematically deal with the specification challenge for ML-based perception
as described in [35].
• A machine learning analyzer that identifies misclassifications leading to
system-level property violations, based on the following main ideas:
- An input space parameterization used to abstract the feature space of
the ML component and relate it to the CPSML input space;
- Systematic sampling methods to explore the feature space of the ML
component, and
- A classifier approximation method used to abstract the ML component
and identify misclassifications that can lead to executions of the CPSML
that violate the temporal logic specification (i.e., system-level counterex-
amples).
• An experimental demonstration of the effectiveness of our approach on two
instantiations of an Automatic Emergency Braking System (AEBS) exam-
ple with multiple deep neural networks trained for object detection and
classification, including some developed by experts in the machine learning
and computer vision communities.
In Sec. 5, we give detailed experimental results on an Automatic Emergency
Braking System (AEBS) involving an image classifier for obstacle detection
based on deep neural networks developed and trained using leading software
packages — AlexNet developed with Caffe [20] and Inception-v3 developed
with TensorFlow [24]. In this journal version of our original conference pa-
per [11], we also present a new case study, an AEBS deployed within the
Udacity self-driving car simulator [2] trained on images generated from the
simulator.
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Related Work
The verification of both CPS and ML algorithms have attracted several re-
search efforts, and we focus here on the most closely related work. Techniques
for the falsification of temporal logic specifications against CPS models have
been implemented based on nonlinear optimization methods and stochastic
search strategies (e.g., Breach [8], S-TaLiRo [3], RRT-REX [10], C2E2 [14]).
While the verification of ML programs is less well-defined [35], recent ef-
forts [38] show how even well trained neural networks can be sensitive to
small adversarial perturbations, i.e., small intentional modifications that lead
the network to misclassify the altered input with large confidence. Other ef-
forts have tried to characterize the correctness of neural networks in terms of
risk [41] (i.e., probability of misclassifying a given input) or robustness [15,7]
(i.e., a minimal perturbation leading to a misclassification), while others pro-
posed methods to generate pictures [29,12] or perturbations [27,29] including
methods based on satisfiability modulo theories (SMT) (e.g., [18]) in such
a way to “fool” neural networks. These methods, while very promising, are
limited to analyzing partial specifications of the ML components in isolation,
and not in the context of a complex, closed-loop cyber-physical system. To
the best of our knowledge, our work is the first to address the verification
of end-to-end temporal logic properties of CPSML—the combination of CPS
and ML systems. The work that is closest in spirit to ours is that on DeepX-
plore [32], where the authors present a whitebox software testing approach for
deep learning systems. However, there are some important differences: their
work performs a detailed analysis of the learning software, whereas ours ana-
lyzes the entire closed-loop CPS while delegating the software analysis to the
machine learning analyzer. Further, we consider temporal logic falsification
whereas their work uses software and neural network coverage metrics. It may
be interesting to see how these approaches can be combined. We believe our
approach is the first step towards performing a more “semantic” adversarial
analysis of systems that employ machine learning, including deep learning [13].
2 Background
2.1 CPSML Models
In this work, we consider models of cyber-physical systems with machine learn-
ing components (CPSML). We assume that a system model is given as a gray-
box simulator defined as a tuple M = (S,U, sim), where S is a set of system
states, U is a set of input values, and sim : S × U × T → S is a simulator
that maps a state s(tk) ∈ S and input value u(tk) ∈ U at time tk ∈ T to a
new state s(tk+1) = sim(s(tk),u(tk), tk), where tk+1 = tk+∆k for a time-step
∆k ∈ Q>0.
Given an initial time t0 ∈ T , an initial state s(t0) ∈ S, a sequence of time-
steps ∆0, . . . ,∆n ∈ Q>0, and a sequence of input values u(t0), . . . ,u(tn) ∈ U ,
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a simulation trace of the model M = (S,U, sim) is a sequence:
(t0, s(t0),u(t0)), (t1, s(t1),u(t1)), . . . , (tn, s(tn),u(tn))
where s(tk+1) = sim(s(tk),u(tk), ∆k) and tk+1 = tk +∆k for k = 0, . . . , n.
The gray-box aspect of the CPSML model is that we assume some knowl-
edge of the internal ML components. Specifically, these components, termed
classifiers, are functions f : X → Y that assign to their input feature vec-
tor x ∈ X a label y ∈ Y , where X and Y are a feature and label space,
respectively. Without loss of generality, we focus on binary classifiers whose
label space is Y = {0, 1}. An ML algorithm selects a classifier using a train-
ing set {(x(1), y(1)), . . . , (x(m), y(m))} where the (x(i), y(i)) are labeled exam-
ples with x(i) ∈ X and y(i) ∈ Y , for i = 1, . . . ,m. The quality of a clas-
sifier can be estimated on a test set of examples comparing the classifier
predictions against the labels of the examples. Precisely, for a given test set
T = {(x(1), y(1)), . . . , (x(l), y(l))}, the number of false positives fpf (T ) and
false negatives fnf (T ) of a classifier f on T are defined as:
fpf (T ) = | {x(i) ∈ T | f(x(i)) = 1 and y(i) = 0} |
fnf (T ) = | {x(i) ∈ T | f(x(i)) = 0 and y(i) = 1} |
(1)
The error rate of f on T is given by:
errf (T ) = (fpf (T ) + fnf (T ))/l (2)
A low error rate implies good predictions of the classifier f on the test set T .
2.2 Signal Temporal Logic
We consider Signal Temporal Logic [23] (STL) as the language to specify
properties to be verified against a CPSML model. STL is an extension of
linear temporal logic (LTL) suitable for the specification of properties of CPS.
A signal is a function s : D → S, with D ⊆ R≥0 an interval and either
S ⊆ B or S ⊆ R, where B = {>,⊥} and R is the set of reals. Signals defined
on B are called booleans, while those on R are said real-valued. A trace w =
{s1, . . . , sn} is a finite set of real-valued signals defined over the same interval
D.
Let Σ = {σ1, . . . , σk} be a finite set of predicates σi : Rn → B, with
σi ≡ pi(x1, . . . , xn) C 0, C ∈ {<,≤}, and pi : Rn → R a function in the
variables x1, . . . , xn.
An STL formula is defined by the following grammar:
ϕ := σ | ¬ϕ |ϕ ∧ ϕ |ϕUIϕ (3)
where σ ∈ Σ is a predicate and I ⊂ R≥0 is a closed non-singular interval.
Other common temporal operators can be defined as syntactic abbreviations
in the usual way, like for instance ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2 := ¬(¬ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2), FIϕ := >UIϕ, or
GIϕ := ¬FI¬ϕ. Given a t ∈ R≥0, a shifted interval I is defined as t + I =
{t+ t′ | t′ ∈ I}.
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Definition 1 (Qualitative semantics) Let w be a trace, t ∈ R≥0, and ϕ
be an STL formula. The qualitative semantics of ϕ is inductively defined as
follows:
w, t |= σ iff σ(w(t)) is true
w, t |= ¬ϕ iff w, t 6|= ϕ
w, t |= ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2 iff w, t |= ϕ1 and w, t |= ϕ2
w, t |= ϕ1UIϕ2 iff ∃t′ ∈ t+ I s.t. w, t′ |= ϕ2 and ∀t′′ ∈ [t, t′], w, t′′ |= ϕ1
(4)
A trace w satisfies a formula ϕ if and only if w, 0 |= ϕ, in short w |= ϕ.
For given signal w, time instant t ∈ R≥0, and STL formula ϕ, the satisfaction
signal X (w, t, ϕ) is > if w, t |= ϕ, ⊥ otherwise.
Given a CPSML model M = (S,U, sim), M |= ϕ if every simulation trace
of M satisfies ϕ.
Definition 2 (Quantitative semantics) Let w be a trace, t ∈ R≥0, and ϕ
be an STL formula. The quantitative semantics of ϕ is defined as follows:
ρ(p(x1, . . . , xn)C 0, w, t) = p(w(t)) with C ∈ {<,≤}
ρ(¬ϕ,w, t) = − ρ(ϕ,w, t)
ρ(ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2, w, t) = min(ρ(ϕ1, w, t), ρ(ϕ2, w, t))
ρ(ϕ1UIϕ2, w, t) = sup
t′∈t+I
min(ρ(ϕ2, w, t
′), inf
t′′[t,t′]
ρ(ϕ1, w, t
′′))
(5)
The robustness of a formula ϕ with respect to a trace w is the signal ρ(ϕ,w, ·).
Quantitative semantics helps to determine how robustly a formula is satis-
fied. Intuitively, the quantitative evaluation of a formula provides a real value
representing the distance to satisfaction or violation. The quantitative and
qualitative semantics are connected. Specifically, it holds that ρ(ϕ,w, t) > 0 if
and only if w, t |= ϕ [9].
Given a CPSML model M = (S,U, sim), and a temporal logic formula ϕ,
the validity domain of ϕ for model M is the subset of U for which traces of M
satisfy ϕ. We denote the validity domain by Uϕ; the remaining set of inputs U \
Uϕ is denoted by U¬ϕ. Note that there are no limitations on the dimensionality
of a validity domain. It can potentially characterize single initial conditions as
well as entire input traces. Usually when we speak of validity domains as sets
of traces, we represent them using a suitable finite parameterization of traces.
Simulation-based verification tools (such as [8]) can approximately compute
validity domains via sampling-based methods.
3 Compositional Falsification Framework
In this section, we formalize the falsification problem for STL specifications
against CPSML models, define our compositional falsification framework, and
show its functionality on the AEBS system of Example 1.
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Definition 3 (Falsification of CPSML) Given a model M = (S,U, sim)
and an STL specification ϕ, find an initial state s(t0) ∈ S and a sequence
of input values u = u(t0), . . . ,u(tn) ∈ U such that the trace of states w =
s(t0), . . . , s(tn) generated by the simulation of M from s(t0) ∈ S under u does
not satisfy ϕ, i.e., w 6|= ϕ. We refer to such (s(t0),u) as counterexamples for
ϕ. The problem of finding a counterexample is often called the falsification
problem.
We now present the compositional framework for the falsification of STL
formulas against CPSML models. Intuitively, the proposed method decom-
poses a given model into two parts: (i) an abstraction of the CPSML model
under the assumption of perfectly correct ML modules, and (ii) its actual ML
components. The two parts are separately analyzed, the first by a temporal
logic falsifier that builds the validity domain with respect to the given speci-
fication, the second by an ML analyzer that identifies sets of feature vectors
that are misclassified by the ML components. Finally, the results of the two
analyses are composed and projected back to a targeted input subspace of the
original CPSML model where counterexamples can be found by invoking a
temporal logic falsifier. We next formalize this procedure.
Let M = (S,U, sim) be a CPSML model and ϕ be an STL specification.
Uϕ is the validity domain of ϕ for M . Thus, for falsification, we wish to find
an element of U¬ϕ. The challenge is that the dimensionality of the input space
U is very high.
We address this challenge through a combination of abstraction and compo-
sitional reasoning. Consider creating an “optimistic” abstraction M+ of M : in
other words, M+ is a version of M with perfect ML components, that is, every
feature vector of the ML feature space is correctly classified. Let us denote by
ml the unabstracted ML components of the model M .
Under the assumption of correct ML components, the lower-dimensional
input space of M+ can be analyzed by constructing the validity domain of ϕ,
that is the partition of the input space of M+ into the sets U+ϕ and U
+
¬ϕ that
do and do not satisfy ϕ, respectively. The set U+¬ϕ comprises inputs on which
the CPSML model violates ϕ even if the ML component operates perfectly,
i.e., the system perceives its environment perfectly. For falsification, we are
interested in identifying points in U+ϕ that correspond to environments in
which a misclassification produced by ml can result in M violating ϕ. This
corresponds to analyzing the behavior of the ML components ml on inputs
corresponding to the set U+ϕ . We refer to this step as the ML analysis. It
can be seen as a procedure for finding a subset Uml ⊆ U of input values
mapping to feature vectors that are misclassified by the ML components ml.
It is important to note that the input space of the CPS model M+ and the
feature spaces of the ML modules ml are different; thus, the ML analyzer must
adapt and relate the two different spaces. This important step will be clarified
in Section 4.
Finally, the set Uml generated by the decomposed analysis of the CPS
model and its ML components targets a small set of input values that are
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misclassified by the ML modules and are likely to falsify ϕ. Thus, system-level
counterexamples in Uml ⊆ U can be determined by invoking a temporal logic
falsifier on ϕ against the original model M .
As explained below, we can pair the “optimistic” abstraction explained
above with a “pessimistic” abstraction as well, so as to obtain a further re-
striction of the input space.
Algorithm 1 CPSML falsification scheme (one iteration between CPS Ana-
lyzer and ML Analyzer)
1: function CompFalsfy(M,ϕ) . M CPSML, ϕ STL specification
2: [M+,ml]←Decompose(M) . M+ – perfect ML, ml – ML component
3: [U+ϕ , U
+
¬ϕ]←ValidityDomain(M+, U, ϕ) . Validity domain of ϕ w.r.t. M+
4: [M−,ml]←Decompose(M) . M− – wrong ML, ml – ML component
5: [U−ϕ , U
−
¬ϕ]←ValidityDomain(M−, U, ϕ) . Validity domain of ϕ w.r.t. M−
6: Urou ← U+ϕ \ U−ϕ . Compute ROU
7: Uml ← MLAnalysis(ml,Urou) . Find misclassified feature vectors in ROU
8: Uml¬ϕ ←Falsify(M,Uml, ϕ). Falsify property on original model with targeted inputs
9: return U+¬ϕ ∪ Uml¬ϕ
10: end function
The compositional falsification procedure is formalized in Algorithm 1
which shows one iteration of creating abstractions, calling the CPS falsifier,
and the ML analyzer. Figure 2 shows the overall procedure which includes
Algorithm 1. CompFalsfy receives as input a CPSML model M and an STL
specification ϕ, and returns a set of falsifying counterexamples. At first, the
algorithm decomposes M into M+ and ml, where M+ is an abstract version
of M with ML components ml that return perfect answers (classifications)
(Line 2). Then, the validity domain of ϕ with respect to the abstraction M+
is computed by ValidityDomain (Line 3). Next, the algorithm computes M−
and ml from M , where M− is an abstract version of M with ML components
ml that always return wrong answers (misclassifications) (Line 4). Note that
this step can be combined with Line 2, but we leave it separate for clarity in
the abstract algorithm specification. Then, the validity domain of ϕ with re-
spect to the abstraction M− is computed by ValidityDomain (Line 5). The
region of uncertainty (ROU), where misclassifications of the ML components
can lead to violations of ϕ, is then computed as Urou (Line 6). From this, the
subset of inputs to the CPSML model that are misclassified by ml is identified
by MLAnalysis (Line 7). Finally, the targeted input set Uml, comprising the
intersection of the sets identified by the decomposed analysis, is searched by a
temporal logic falsifier on the original model M (Line 8) and the set of inputs
that falsify the temporal logic formula are returned. It is important to note
that the counterexamples we generate are for the concrete CPSML model M ,
i.e., the one with the actual ML component, not its optimistic or pessimistic
abstraction.
Note that the above approach can be implemented even without computing
M− (Lines 4-6), in which case the entire validity domain of ϕ is considered as
Compositional Falsification of CPSML 11
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Fig. 2: Compositional Falsification Technique. The method combines abstrac-
tion of the ML component with temporal logic falsification of the abstracted
system and analysis of the ML component.
the ROU. For simplicity, we will take this truncated approach in the example
described below. In Section 5, we will describe results on the AEBS case study
with the full approach.
Example 2 Let us consider the model described in Example 1 and let us assume
that the concrete input space U of the CPSML model M consists of the initial
velocity of the subject vehicle vel(0), the initial distance between the vehicle
and the preceding obstacle dist(0), and the sequence of pictures that can be
captured by the camera. Let ϕ := G[0,T ](dist(t) ≥ τ) be a specification that
requires the vehicle to be always farther than τ from the preceding obstacle.
Instead of analyzing the whole input space U (including a vast number of
pictures), we adopt our compositional framework to target a specific subset of
U . Let M+ be the optimistic abstraction of the AEBS model, i.e., assuming a
perfectly working image classifier, and let ml be the actual classifier. We begin
by computing the validity subsets U+ϕ and U
+
¬ϕ of ϕ against M
+, considering
only vel(0) and dist(0) and assuming exact distance measurements during
the simulation. Next, we analyze only the image classifier ml on pictures of
obstacles whose distances fall in U+ϕ , say in a range [dm, dM ] (see Figure 3).
Our ML analyzer generates only pictures of obstacles whose distances are in
[dm, dM ], finds possible sets of images that are misclassified, and returns the
corresponding distances that, when projected back to U , yields the subset
Uml of U . Finally, a temporal logic falsifier can be invoked to search over the
restricted input space Uml and a set of counterexamples is returned.
Algorithm 1 and the above example show how our compositional approach
relies on three key steps: (i) computing the validity domain for an STL formula
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Fig. 3: Compositional falsification scheme on AEBS model. The “score” in-
dicates the confidence level with which the classifier determines whether the
image contains a car or not.
for a given simulation model; (ii) falsifying an STL formula on a simulation
model, and (iii) a ML analyzer that computes a sub-space of its input feature
space that leads to misclassifications. The first two steps have been well-studied
in the literature on simulation-based verification of CPS, and implemented in
tools such as Breach [8]. We discuss our approach to Step (iii) in the next sec-
tion — our ML analyzer that identifies misclassifications of the ML component
relevant to the overall CPSML input space.
4 Machine Learning Analyzer
A central idea in our approach to analyzing CPSML models is to use abstrac-
tions of the ML components. For instance, in the preceding section, we used the
notions of perfect ML classifiers and always-wrong classifiers in computing the
region of uncertainty (ROU). In this section, we extend this abstraction-based
approach to the ML classifier and its input (feature) space.
One motivation for our approach comes from the application domain of
autonomous driving where machine learning is used for object detection and
perception. Instead of exploring the high-dimensional input space for the ML
classifier involving all combinations of pixels, we instead perform the key sim-
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plification of exploring realistic and meaningful modifications to a given image
dataset that corresponds to the ROU. Autonomous driving groups spend copi-
ous amounts of time collecting images and video to train their learning-based
perception systems with. We focus on analyzing the space of images that is
“close” to this data set but with semantically significant modifications that
can identify problematic cases for the overall system.
The space of modifications to input feature vectors (say, images) induces
an abstract space over the concrete feature (image) space. Let us denote the
abstract input domain by A. Given a classifier f : X → Y , our ML analyzer
computes a simpler function f˜ : A → Y that approximates f on the abstract
domain A. The abstract domain of the function f˜ is analyzed and clusters
of misclassifying abstract elements are identified. The concretizations of such
elements are subsets of features that are misclassified by the original classifier
f . We describe further details of this approach in the remainder of this section.
4.1 Feature Space Abstraction
Let X˜ ⊆ X be a subset of the feature space of f : X → Y . Let ≤ be a
total order on a set A called the abstract set. An abstraction function is an
injective function α : X˜ → A that maps every feature vector x ∈ X˜ to an
abstract element α(x) ∈ A. Conversely, the concretization function γ : A→ X˜
maps every abstraction a ∈ A to a feature γ(a) ∈ X˜.
The abstraction and concretization functions play a fundamental role in our
falsification framework. First, they allow us to map the input space of the CPS
model to the feature space of its classifiers. Second, the abstract space can be
used to analyze the classifiers on a compact domain as opposite to intractable
feature spaces. These concepts are clarified in the following example, where a
feature space of pictures is abstracted into a three-dimensional unit hyper-box.
Example 3 Let X be the set of RGB pictures of size 1000 × 600, i.e., X =
{0, . . . , 255}1000×600×3. Suppose we are interested in analyzing a ML image
classifier in the context of our AEBS system. In this case, we are interested
in images of road scenarios rather than on arbitrary images in X. Further,
assume that we start with a reference data set of images of a car on a two-lane
highway with a desert road background, as shown in Figure 4. Suppose that
we are interested only in the constrained feature space X˜ ⊆ X comprising this
desert road scenario with a single car on the highway and three dimensions
along which the scene can be varied: (i) the x-dimension (lateral) position of
the car; (ii) the z-dimension (distance from the sensor) position of the car,
and (iii) the brightness of the image. The x and z positions of the car and the
brightness level of the picture can be seen as the dimensions of an abstract set
A. In this setting, we can define the abstraction and concretization functions α
and γ that relate the abstract set A = [0, 1]3 and X˜. For instance, the picture
γ(0, 0, 0) sees the car on the left, close to the observer, and low brightness;
the picture γ(1, 0, 0) places the car shifted to the right; on the other extreme,
γ(1, 1, 1) has the car on the right, far away from the observer, and with a high
14 Dreossi, Donze´, Seshia
Fig. 4: Feature Space Abstraction. The cube represents the abstract space A
with the three dimensions corresponding to three different image modifica-
tions. The displayed road images correspond to concretized elements of the
concrete feature space X˜.
brightness level. Figure 4 depicts some car pictures of S˜ disposed accordingly
to their position in the abstract domain A (the surrounding box).
4.2 Approximation of Learning Components
We now describe how the feature space abstraction can be used to construct
an approximation that helps the identification of misclassified feature vectors.
Given a classifier f : X → Y and a constrained feature space X˜ ⊆ X, we
want to determine an approximated classifier f˜ : A→ Y , such that errf˜ (T ) ≤
, for some 0 ≤  ≤ 1 and test set T = {(a(1), y(1)), . . . , (a(l), y(l))}, with
y(i) = f(γ(a(i))), for i = 1, . . . , l.
Intuitively, the proposed approximation scheme samples elements from the
abstract set, computes the labels of the concretized elements using the ana-
lyzed learning algorithm, and finally, interpolates the abstract elements and
the corresponding labels in order to obtain an approximation function. Con-
structing such an approximation has multiple uses: (i) The process of finding
a good approximation of f appears to drive the sampling of elements towards
misclassifications that lead to system-level counterexamples, and (ii) the ob-
tained approximation f˜ can be used to perform higher-level analysis of the
reason for misclassifications, e.g., by identifying clusters of misclassified fea-
ture vectors that share common characteristics. We elaborate on these aspects
later in this section.
The Approximation algorithm (Algorithm 2) formalizes the proposed
approximation construction technique. It receives in input an abstract domain
A for the concretization function γ : A→ X˜, with X˜ ⊆ X, the error threshold
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Algorithm 2 Approximation construction of classifier f : X → Y
1: function Approximation(A, γ, ) . A abstract set (γ : A→ X˜), 0 ≤  ≤ 1
2: TI ← ∅
3: repeat
4: TI ← TI∪ sample(A, f)
5: f˜ ← interpolate(TI)
6: TE ← sample(A, f)
7: until errf˜ (TE) ≤ 
8: return f˜
9: end function
0 ≤  ≤ 1, and returns a function f˜ : A → Y that approximates f on the
constrained feature space X˜. The algorithm consists of a loop that iteratively
improves the approximation f˜ . At every iteration, the algorithm populates the
interpolation test set TI by sampling abstract features from A and computing
the concretized labels according to f (Line 4), i.e., sample(A, f)= {(a, y) |
a ∈ A˜, y = f(γ(a))}, where A˜ ⊆ A is a finite subset of samples determined
with some sampling method. Next, the algorithm interpolates the points of TI
(Line 5) according to a suitably-chosen interpolation technique. The result is
a function f˜ : A→ Y that simplifies the original classifier f on the concretized
constrained feature space X˜. The approximation is evaluated on the test set
TE . Note that at each iteration, TE changes while TI incrementally grows. The
algorithm iterates until the error rate errf˜ (TE) is smaller than the desired
threshold  (Line 7). This is a heuristic function approximation method, and
there is no formal guarantee on termination of the loop; however, in practice,
we have found that the loop always terminates with the desired error less than
.
The technique with which the samples in TE and TI are selected strongly
influences the accuracy of the approximation. A good sampling method can
find corner-case misclassifications and provide better high-level insight into
the regions of the abstract space where f generates misclassifications. In or-
der to have a good coverage of the abstract set A, we propose the usage of
low-discrepancy sampling methods that, differently from uniform random sam-
pling, cover sets quickly and evenly. In this work, we use the Halton and lattice
sequences, two common and easy-to-implement sampling methods, which we
explain next.
4.3 Sampling Methods
Discrepancy is a notion from equidistribution theory [43,33] that finds applica-
tion in quasi-Monte Carlo techniques for error estimation and approximating
the mean, standard deviation, integral, global maxima and minima of compli-
cated functions, such as, e.g., our classification functions.
Definition 4 (Discrepancy [28]) Let X = {x(1), . . . ,x(m)} be a finite set
of points in n-dimensional unit space, i.e., X ⊂ [0, 1]n. The discrepancy of X
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is given by:
D(X) = sup
B∈J
| #(X,B)
m
− vol(B) | (6)
where #(X,B) = |{x ∈ X | x ∈ B}|, i.e., the number of points in X that fall
in B, vol(B) is the n-dimensional volume of B, and J is the set of boxes of
the form {x ∈ Rn|ai ≤ xi ≤ bi}, where i = 1, . . . , n and 0 ≤ ai < bi < 1.
Definition 5 (Low-discrepancy sequence [28]) A low-discrepancy sequence,
also called quasi-random sequence, is a sequence with the property that for all
m ∈ N, its subsequence X = {x(1), . . . ,x(m)} has low discrepancy.
Low-discrepancy sequences fill spaces more uniformly than uncorrelated
random points. This property makes low-discrepancy sequences suitable for
problems where grids are involved, but it is unknown in advance how fine
the grid must be to attain precise results. A low-discrepancy sequence can
be stopped at any point where convergence is observed, whereas the usual
uniform random sampling technique requires a large number of computations
between stopping points [40]. Low-discrepancy sampling methods have im-
proved computational techniques in many areas, including robotics [6], image
processing [16], computer graphics [36], numerical integration [37], and opti-
mization [31].
We now introduce two low-discrepancy sequences that will be used in this
work. For more sequences and details see, e.g., [30].
1. Halton sequence [28]. Based on the choice of an arbitrary prime number p,
the i-th sample is obtained by representing i in base p, reversing its digits,
and moving the decimal point by one position. The resulting number is
the i-th sample in base p. For the multi-dimensional case, it is sufficient to
choose a different prime number for each dimension. In practice, this pro-
cedure corresponds to choosing a prime base p, dividing the [0, 1] interval
in p segments, then p2 segments, and so on.
2. Lattice sequence [25]. A lattice can be seen as the generalization of a multi-
dimensional grid with possibly nonorthogonal axes. Let α1, . . . , αn−1 ∈
R>0 be irrational numbers and m ∈ N. The i-th sample of a lattice se-
quence is (i/m, {iα1}, . . . , {iαn−1}), where the curly braces {·} denote the
fractional part of the real value (modulo-one arithmetic).
Example 4 We now analyze two Convolutional Neural Networks (CNNs): the
Caffe [20] version of AlexNet [22] and the Inception-v3 model of Tensor-
flow [24], both trained on the ImageNet database [1]. We sample 1000 points
from the abstract domain defined in Example 3 using the lattice sampling tech-
niques. These points encode the x and z displacements of a car in a picture
and its brightness level (see Figure 4). Figure 5 (a) depicts the sampled points
with their concretized labels. The green circles indicate correct classifications,
i.e., the classifier identified a car, the red circles denote misclassifications, i.e.,
no car detected. The linear interpolation of the obtained points leads to an ap-
proximation function. The error rates errf˜ (TE) of the obtained approximations
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(i.e., the discrepancies between the predictions of the original image classifiers
and their approximations) computed on 300 randomly picked test cases are
0.0867 and 0.1733 for AlexNet and Inception-v3, respectively. Figure 5 (b)
shows the projections of the approximation functions for the brightness value
0.2. The more red a region, the larger the sets of pictures for which the neural
networks do not detect a car. For illustrative purposes, we superimpose the
projections of Figure 5 (b) over the background used for the picture gener-
ation. These illustrations show the regions of the concrete feature vectors in
which a vehicle is misclassified.
The analysis of Example 4 on AlexNet and Inception-v3 provides useful
insights. First, we observe that Inception-v3 outperforms AlexNet on the con-
sidered road pictures since it correctly classifies more pictures than AlexNet.
Second, we notice that AlexNet tends to correctly classify pictures in which
the x abstract component is either close to 0 or 1, i.e., pictures in which the
car is not in the middle of the street, but on one of the two lanes. This suggests
that the model might not have been trained enough with pictures of cars in
the center of the road. Third, using the lattice method on Inception-v3, we
were able to identify a corner case misclassification in a cluster of correct pre-
dictions (note the isolated red cross with coordinates (0.1933, 0.0244, 0.4589)).
All this information provides insights on the classifiers that can be useful in
the hunt for counterexamples.
5 Experimental Results
In this section we present two case studies, both involving an Automatic
Emergency Braking System (AEBS), but differing in the details of the un-
derlying simulator and controller. The first is a Simulink-based AEBS, the
second is a Unity-Udacity simulator-based AEBS. The first case study show-
cases our full compositional falsification method based on abstraction and
compositional reasoning. The second case study shows how we can apply fal-
sification directly on the concrete CPSML model (i.e. without performing the
optimistic/pessimistic abstractions of the neural network) while synthesizing
sequences of images that lead to a system-level counterexample.
The falsification framework for the first case study has been implemented in
a Matlab toolbox.1 The framework for the second case study has been written
in Python and C#.2 Our tools deal with models of CPSML and STL specifi-
cations. They mainly consist of a temporal logic falsifier and an ML analyzer
that interact to falsify the given STL specification against the decomposed
models. As an STL falsifier, we chose the existing tool Breach [8], while the
ML analyzer has been implemented from scratch. The main reason to choose
Breach is that our system-level specification is in signal temporal logic, which is
the requirement language underlying this tool. Further, it has been developed
1 https://github.com/dreossi/analyzeNN
2 https://bitbucket.org/sseshia/uufalsifier
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(a) Sampling.
(b) Interpolation projection.
(c) Feature space analysis.
Fig. 5: ML analysis of AlexNet network developed with Caffe (top) and
Inception-v3 network developed with Tensorflow (bottom) on a road scenario.
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Fig. 6: Simulink model of a semi-autonomous vehicle with AEBS.
in our group at UC Berkeley, allowing for better integration with the other
software components. We leverage both the qualitative and the quantitative
semantics of Breach. The qualitative semantics is used to compute the validity
domains of specifications used in our case studies. The quantitative semantics
is used by Breach (and similar tools) to translate the STL formula into a cost
function to be minimized so as to find a trace that drives its value below zero,
i.e., a property violation. The ML analyzer implementation has two compo-
nents: the feature space abstractor and the ML approximation algorithm (see
Section 4). The feature space abstractor implements a scene generator that
concretizes the abstracted feature vectors. The algorithm that computes an
approximation of the analyzed ML component gives the user the option of
selecting the sampling method and interpolation technique, as well as setting
the desired error rate. Our tools are interfaced with the deep learning frame-
works Caffe [20] and Tensorflow [24]. We ran our tests on a desktop computer
Dell XPS 8900, Intel (R) Core(TM) i7-6700 CPU 3.40GHz, DIMM RAM 16
GB 2132 MHz, GPUs NVIDIA GeForce GTX Titan X and Titan Xp, with
Ubuntu 14.04.5 LTS and Matlab R2016b.
5.1 Case Study 1: Simulink-based AEBS
Our first case study is a closed-loop Simulink model of a semi-autonomous
vehicle with an Advanced Emergency Braking System (AEBS) [39] connected
to a deep neural network-based image classifier. The model mainly consists
of a four-speed automatic transmission controller linked to an AEBS that
automatically prevents collisions with preceding obstacles and alleviates the
harshness of a crash when a collision is likely to happen (see Figure 6). The
AEBS determines a braking mode depending on the speed of the vehicle vs, the
possible presence of a preceding obstacle, its velocity vp, and the longitudinal
distance dist between the two. The distance dist is provided by radars having
30m of range. For obstacles farther than 30m, the camera, connected to an
image classifier, alerts the AEBS that, in the case of detected obstacle, goes
into warning mode.
Depending on vs, vp, dist, and the presence of obstacles detected by the
image classifier, the AEBS computes the time to collision and longitudinal
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Fig. 7: Validity domain for G(¬(dist(t)) ≤ 0) and AEBS model with different
abstractions of ML component. The initial velocity and distance are on the x and y axes
respectively. The dotted (horizontal) line is the image classifier activation threshold. Green
indicates combinations of initial velocity and distance for which the property is satisfied and
red indicates combinations for which the property is falsified. Our ML analyzer performs
both optimistic (left) and pessimistic (middle) abstractions of the neural network classifier.
On the right-most image, the yellow region denotes the region of uncertainty (ROU).
safety indices, whose values determine a controlled transition between safe,
warning, braking, and collision mitigation modes. In safe mode, the car does
not need to brake. In warning mode, the driver should brake to avoid a colli-
sion. If this does not happen, the system goes into braking mode, where the
automatic brake slows down the vehicle. Finally, in collision mitigation mode,
the system, determining that a crash is unavoidable, triggers a full braking
action aimed to minimize the damage.
To establish the correctness of the system and in particular of its AEBS
controller, we formalize the STL specification G(¬(dist(t)) ≤ 0), that requires
dist(t) to always be positive, i.e., no collision happens. The input space is
vs(0) ∈ [0, 40] (mph), dist(0) ∈ [0, 60] (m), and the set of all RGB pictures of
size 1000× 600. The preceding vehicle is not moving, i.e., vp(t) = 0 (mph).
At first, we compute the validity domain of ϕ assuming that the radars
are able to provide exact measurements for any distance dist(t) and the image
classifier correctly detects the presence of a preceding vehicle. The computed
validity domain is depicted in Figure 7 (left-most image): green for Uϕ and
red for U¬ϕ. Next, we try to identify candidate counterexamples that belong
to the satisfactory set (i.e., the inputs that satisfy the specification) but might
be influenced by a misclassification of the image classifier. Since the AEBS
relies on the classifier only for distances larger than 30m, we can focus on the
subset of the input space with dist(0) ≥ 30. Specifically, we identify potential
counterexamples by analyzing a pessimistic version of the model where the
ML component always misclassifies the input pictures (see Figure 7, middle
image). From these results, we can compute the region of uncertainty, shown in
Figure 7 on the right. We can then focus our attention on the ROU, as shown
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Fig. 8: Analysis of Region of Uncertainty (ROU) for AEBS and property
G(¬(dist(t)) ≤ 0). Red crosses in the ROU denote misclassifications gener-
ated by the ML analyzer that leads to a system-level counterexample. A circle
denotes a “benign” misclassification.
in Fig. 8. In particular, we can identify candidate counterexamples, such as,
for instance, (25, 40) (i.e., vs(0) = 25 and dist(0) = 40).
Next, let us consider the AlexNet image classifier and the ML analyzer
presented in Section 4 that generates pictures from the abstract feature space
A = [0, 1]3, where the dimensions of A determine the x and z displacements of
a car and the brightness of a generated picture, respectively. The goal now is to
determine an abstract feature ac ∈ A related to the candidate counterexample
(25, 40), that generates a picture that is misclassified by the ML component
and might lead to a violation of the specification ϕ. The dist(0) component
of uc = (25, 40) determines a precise z displacement a2 = 0.2 in the abstract
picture. The connection between the abstract and input spaces is defined by
the abstraction function that, in this case, was manually defined by the user.
In general, this connection can be explicitly provided by a synthetic data gen-
erator such as, for instance, a simulator or image renderer. Now, we need to
determine the values of the abstract x displacement and brightness. Looking
at the interpolation projection of Figure 5 (b), we notice that the approxima-
tion function misclassifies pictures with abstract component a1 ∈ [0.4, 0.5] and
a3 = 0.2. Thus, it is reasonable to try to falsify the original model on the input
element vs(0) = 25, dist(0) = 40, and concretized picture γ(0.5, 0.2, 0.2). For
this targeted input, the temporal logic falsifier computed a robustness value for
ϕ of −24.60, meaning that a falsifying counterexample has been found. Other
counterexamples found with the same technique are, e.g., (27, 45) or (31, 56)
that, associated with the correspondent concretized pictures with a1 = 0.5
and a3 = 0.2, lead to the robustness values −23.86 and −24.38, respectively
(see Figure 8, red crosses). Conversely, we also disproved some candidate coun-
terexamples, such as (28, 50), (24, 35), or (25, 45), whose robustness values are
9.93, 7.40, and 7.67 (see Figure 8, green circles).
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For experimental purposes, we try to falsify a counterexample in which we
change the x position of the abstract feature so that the approximation func-
tion correctly classifies the picture. For instance, by altering the counterexam-
ple (27, 45) with γ(0.5, 0.225, 0.2) to (27, 45) with γ(1.0, 0.225, 0.2), we obtain
a robustness value of 9.09, that means that the AEBS is able to avoid the car
for the same combination of velocity and distance of the counterexample, but
different x position of the preceding vehicle. Another example, is the robust-
ness value −24.38 of the falsifying input (31, 56) with γ(0.5, 0.28, 0.2), that
altered to γ(0.0, 0.28, 0.2), changes to 12.41.
Finally, we test Inception-v3 on the corner case misclassification identi-
fied in Section 4.2 (i.e., the picture γ(0.1933, 0.0244, 0.4589)). The distance
dist(0) = 4.88 related to this abstract feature is below the activation thresh-
old of the image classifier. Thus, the falsification points are exactly the same as
those of the computed validity domain (i.e., dist(0) = 4.88 and vs(0) ∈ [4, 40]).
This study shows how a misclassification of the ML component might not affect
the correctness of the CPSML model.
5.2 Case Study 2: Unity-Udacity Simulator-based AEBS
We now analyze an AEBS deployed within Udacity’s self-driving car simula-
tor.3 The simulator, built with the Unity game engine4, can be used to teach
cars how to navigate roads using deep learning. We modified the simulator
in order to focus exclusively on the braking system. In our settings, the car
steers by following some predefined waypoints, while acceleration and braking
are controlled by an AEBS connected to a CNN. An onboard camera sends
images to the CNN whose task is to detect cows on the road. Whenever an
obstacle is detected, the AEBS triggers a brake that slows the vehicle down
and prevents the collision against the obstacle.
We implemented a CNN that classifies the pictures captured by the on-
board camera in two categories “cow” and “not cow”. The CNN has been im-
plemented and trained using Tensorflow. We connected the CNN to the Unity
C# class that controls the car. The communication between the neural network
and the braking controller happens via Socket.IO protocol.5 A screenshot of
the car braking in presence of a cow is shown in Figure 9a. A video of the AEBS
in action can be seen at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Sa4oLGcHAhY.
The CNN architecture is depicted in Figure 10. The network consists of
eight layers: the first six are alternations of convolutions and max-pools with
ReLU activations, the last two are a fully connected layer and a softmax that
outputs the network prediction. The dimensions and hyperparameters of our
neural network are shown in Table 1, where l is a layer, n
[l]
H × n[l]W × n[l]C is the
3 Udacity’s Self-Driving Car Simulator: https://github.com/udacity/
self-driving-car-sim
4 Unity: https://unity3d.com/
5 Socket.IO protocol: https://github.com/socketio
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(a) Correct detection and braking. (b) Misclassification and collision.
Fig. 9: Unity-Udacity simulator AEBS. The onboard camera sends images
to the CNN. When a cow is detected a braking action is triggered un-
til the car comes to a complete stop. Full videos available at https://
www.youtube.com/watch?v=Sa4oLGcHAhY and https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=MaRoU5OgimE.
Fig. 10: CNN architecture.
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
n
[l]
H × n
[l]
W 128× 128 128× 128 64× 64 64× 64 32× 32 32× 32 16× 16 128× 1 2× 1
n
[l]
C 3 32 32 32 32 64 64 1 1
f [l] - 3 2 3 2 3 2 - -
p[l] - 1 0 1 0 1 0 - -
s[l] - 1 2 1 2 1 2 - -
Table 1: CNN dimensions and hyperparameters.
dimension of the volume computed by the layer l, f [l] is the filter size, p[l] is
the padding, and s[l] is the stride.
Our dataset, composed by 1k road images, was split into 80% train data
and 20% validation. We trained our model using cross-entropy cost function
and Adam algorithm optimizer with learning rate 10−4. Our model reached
0.95 accuracy on the validation set.
In our experimental evaluation, we are interested in finding a case where
our AEBS fails, i.e., the car collides against a cow. This requirement can be
formalized as the STL specification G(‖scar − scow‖ > 0) that imposes the
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(a) Grid-based sampling. (b) Halton sequence sampling.
Fig. 11: CNN analysis.
Euclidean distance of the car and cow positions (scar and scow, respectively)
to be always positive.
We analyzed the CNN feature space by considering the abstract space
A = [0, 1]3, where the dimensions of A determine the displacement of the cow
of ±4m along the x-axis, its rotation along the y-axis, and the intensity of the
red color channel. We sampled the elements from the abstract space using both
Halton sequence and a grid-based approach. The obtained results are shown
in Figure 11. In both figures, green points are those that lead to images that
are correctly classified by the CNN; conversely, red points denote images that
are misclassified by the CNN and can potentially lead to a system falsification.
Note how we were able to identify a cluster of misclassifying images (lower-
left corners of both Figures 11a and 11b) as well as an isolated corner case
(upper-center, Figure 11a).
Finally, we ran some simulations with the misclassifying images identified
by our analysis. Most of them brought the car to collide against the cow.
A screenshot of a collision is shown in Figure 9b. The full video is available
at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MaRoU5OgimE.
6 Conclusion
We presented a compositional falsification framework for STL specifications
against CPSML models based on a decomposition between the analysis of ma-
chine learning components and the system contained them. We introduced an
ML analyzer able to abstract feature spaces, approximate ML classifiers, and
provide sets of misclassified feature vectors that can be used to drive the falsi-
fication process. We implemented our framework and showed its effectiveness
for an autonomous driving controller using perception based on deep neural
networks.
This work lays the basis for future advancements. There are several direc-
tions for future work, both theoretical and applied. In the remainder of this
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section, we describe this landscape for future work. See [35] for a broader dis-
cussion of these points in the context of the goal of verified intelligent systems.
Improvements in the ML Analyzer: We intend to improve our ML Analyzer
exploring the automatic generation of feature space abstractions from given
training sets. One direction is to exploit the structure of ML components, e.g.,
the custom architectures that have been developed for deep neural networks in
applications such as autonomous driving [19]. For instance, one could perform
a sensitivity analysis that indicates along which axis in the abstract space
we should move in order to change the output label or reduce the confidence
of the classifier on its output. Another direction is to improve the sampling
techniques that we have explored so far, ideally devising one that captures
the probability of detecting a corner-case scenario leading to a property vio-
lation. Of particular interest are adaptive sampling methods involving further
cooperation between the ML Analyzer and the CPS Analyzer. We are also
interested in integrating other techniques for generating misclassifications of
ML components (e.g., [27,18,7]) into our approach.
Impacting the ML component design: Our falsification approach produces in-
put sequences that result in the violation of a desired property. While this
is useful, it is arguably even more useful to obtain higher-level interpretable
insight into where the training data falls short, what new scenarios must be
added to the training set, and how the learning algorithms’ parameters must
be adjusted to improve accuracy. For example, one could use techniques for
mining specifications or requirements (e.g., [21,42]) to aggregate interesting
test images or video into a cluster that can be represented in a high-level fash-
ion. One could also apply our ML Analyzer outside the falsification context,
such as for controller synthesis.
From Falsification to Verification: The compositional framework we introduced
in this paper can also be used for verification of a CPSML model. In particular,
if one has a verifier that can prove safety properties of the abstract systems
(the optimistic and pessimistic abstractions shown as M− and M+ in Figure 2)
and one has a systematic refinement strategy that can cover the ROU, then
the same compositional framework can be used to prove safety properties of
the CPSML model. We plan to explore this direction in future work.
Further Applications: Although our approach has shown initial promise for
reasoning about autonomous driving systems, much more remains to be done
to make this practical. Real sensor systems for autonomous driving involve
multiple sensors (cameras, LIDAR, RADAR, etc.) whose raw outputs are often
fused and combined with deep learning or other ML techniques to extract
higher level information (such as the location and type of objects around the
vehicle). This sensor space has very high dimensionality and high complexity,
not to mention streams of sensor input (e.g., video), that one must be able to
analyze efficiently. To handle industrial-scale production systems, our overall
analysis must be scaled up substantially, potentially via use of cloud computing
infrastructure. Finally, our compositional methodology could be extended to
other, non-cyber-physical, systems that contain ML components.
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